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As Melanesia enters the new millennium, what role will local cultural
and political institutions play in the region’s young nation states? This is a
contentious issue as diverse tribal groups attempt to renegotiate their rela-
tionships with state governments. Many of them are attempting to employ
indigenous social models and concepts to restructure those relationships
into ones predicated more on political equality. For example, Andrew
Strathern has reported New Guinea Highlanders behaving toward a local
government branch as if it were a rival clan, demanding compensation
from it and thereby “nullifying hierarchy” (1994, 64; see also Zuckerman
1981). Deborah Gewertz and Frederick Errington have found Chambri
employing compensation in a similar way, holding the state responsible
for actions of its employees and their families even when those actions are
unrelated to their government duties (1991, 169–185).1 Nancy Lutkehaus
has told of Manam Islanders welcoming a visiting prime minister with a
ceremony that cast him as a traditional trading partner, hoping to thereby
“transform him into an equal” (1991). Robert Foster (1998, 83) summa-
rized Jeffrey Clark’s (1997) portrayal of Melanesians who imagine the
Papua New Guinea state “as a classic Melanesian ‘big man’ whom they
follow if and only if the big man remains bound by moral obligations of
reciprocity and redistribution” (Foster’s emphasis). As these various
indigenous models are employed in novel and evolving contexts within
particular histories, their meanings are transformed. This paper explores
this process in relation to one institution, compensation, among one
group of Melanesians, people of Malaita, the most populous island in the
southeastern Solomons (map 1).35
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akin • compensation and the melanesian state 37Melanesians are rapidly broadening their use of compensation. Claims
are no longer confined to local-level disputes; with growing frequency,
people demand payments from governments, corporations, and other
external entities. The targets of these innovative claims and other analysts
commonly evaluate them using primarily economic or legalistic concep-
tions of compensation. Yet those pressing the claims often seek more than
simple monetary recompense. As is true in more strictly local disputes,
claimants often employ compensation in these cases to address broader
aspects of their relationships with targeted groups, and understanding
their actions requires deeper historical and social analysis of those rela-
tionships. To interpret such cases any investigation must be expanded to
include issues beyond those explicitly addressed in formal claims (see Filer
1990, 1997; Kirsch 1997; Strathern 1981; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997).
In the years since Solomon Islands independence in 1978, Malaitans
have presented the central government with numerous compensation
claims regarding issues ranging over historical events, timber and mining,
and interethnic disputes. The main ethnographic focus here will be one
series of such claims originating in the eastern Kwaio region of central
Malaita. The Kwaio mountains are home to the last Solomons population
still practicing their ancestral religion, while a larger group of Kwaio Chris-
tians lives in large villages on the coast. Throughout the 1980s, Kwaio
made highly publicized demands for compensation for the outrages of a
1927 government punitive expedition, launched after the assassination of
District Officer William Bell and most of his party while they were trying
to collect Kwaio guns and taxes (Keesing and Corris 1980). This cam-
paign for government compensation has received wide support across
Kwaio within both traditionalist and Christian communities, and was for
several years the main focus of local kastom political activities (ie, activities
framed in terms of empowering local traditions).2 Although payment has
not been forthcoming, many Kwaio vow to continue pursuing their claim.
The larger Kwaio community is deeply and multiply divided on most
political issues, and the question arises of why the idea of demanding com-
pensation in this case has been so compelling for so many people. Here I
approach this problem from several perspectives, examining fundamental
Malaitan ideas about compensation, meanings that compensation has ac-
quired through its role in Malaitan political and church history, and con-
temporary local perspectives on government and development. Only by
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has come to have and, more specifically, why claiming “the Bell compen-
sation” has had such tremendous appeal for Kwaio as a way to approach
the state.
The paper also addresses how Malaitans more generally perceive the
state and their island’s future status within the nation. Many Malaitans
see the government as a political adversary, and they continue to interact
with it using strategies and concepts once employed to resist British colo-
nial administrations. Particularly important here are political philosophies
based around Malaitan variants of the concept of kastom, especially con-
ceptions of “kastom chiefs” (see White and Lindstrom 1997) and “kastom
law.” These and related kastom concepts have been far from stable, how-
ever, and since the 1930s their meanings have continually changed with
the shifting character of the Solomons government and its relationship to
Solomon Islanders. This is particularly so regarding compensation, which,
as I shall show, has long been a key symbol within Malaitan identity and
resistance ideologies.
Understanding Malaitan compensation and its modern meanings has
recently become a more pressing matter for Solomon Islanders. In 1989
and 1996 the capital, Honiara, was paralyzed by riots as Malaitans ex-
torted large compensation payments from the government for insults
made against their island, and similar confrontations are likely in the
future. The paper concludes with a discussion of how my analysis of the
Kwaio claims can also throw light on these urban clashes. But first, the
Bell compensation.
The Assassination of Bell and the Government’s Revenge
During the 1910s and 1920s the British pushed to gain control over the
southeastern Solomons by installing a network of district officers com-
manding small constabularies and enforcing a male head tax (photo 1).
By far their most concerted opposition came from Malaitans, but in the
decade before 1927, William Bell enjoyed dramatic success in imposing
pax Britannica there. By that year, only eastern Kwaio still resisted the
government, and Bell was aggressively confronting Kwaio warriors by en-
forcing the tax and confiscating their rifles. His assassination and the gov-
ernment punitive expedition that followed have been well documented by
the late Roger Keesing and historian Peter Corris in their book Lightning
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Photo 1. The visiting high commissioner reviews the native constabulary at
Tulagi golf course, with Bell in attendance, in 1927, not long before the attack at
Sinalagu. (The original caption was “The soldiers who guard and defend us.”)
(Courtesy of Andrea Bannatyne and the British Museum of Mankind)Meets the West Wind (1980) and I summarize them here only as they per-
tain directly to my analysis of the Kwaio compensation claims.
The surprise attack at the October 1927 tax collection was planned
and executed primarily by men of three kin groups inland from Sinalagu
Harbour and did not involve most Kwaio. Bell, fourteen of his party, and
two Kwaio attackers died. Most of the dead were soldiers from northern
Malaita. Two weeks later a government force consisting of fifty Austra-
lian soldiers, twenty-eight white civilians, and some fifty Malaitan police
and volunteers primarily from the north, arrived in Kwaio aboard hmas
Adelaide. The Europeans were ineffective in the rugged terrain, but the
Malaitan police, skilled jungle fighters, had a field day. As Keesing and
Corris described it, “desecration, garden destroying, shooting pigs and
burning houses were diversions. The order of the day was people hunt-
ing. . . . Whatever orders they received from above, their mission was to
avenge Bell and, most of all, their own slain relatives” (1980, 166). Women
and girls were gang-raped and many were shot, children were murdered,
and prisoners were routinely executed and their bodies mutilated. Most
of the victims had played no part in the attack on Bell’s party. Soldiers
assaulted not only Sinalagu area communities but also those behind
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central mountains into western Kwaio. They met virtually no armed resis-
tance. Keesing and Corris estimated that some sixty people were shot,
and many children died of exposure while hiding in the jungle. The sol-
diers systematically desecrated ancestral shrines and sacred men’s houses,
and Kwaio believe this provoked angry spirits to kill more descendants
later through illness and mishap. About two hundred men, most of them
innocent of any crime, were jailed in Tulagi, where thirty-one soon died in
a prison dysentery epidemic. Six were hanged and seventeen sentenced to
lengthy prison terms.
These calamities set a tone for Kwaio relations with outsiders that per-
sists today. In the eyes of many in the Solomons, “the Bell massacre” cer-
tified the character of all Kwaio as villainous savages, innately primitive,
treacherous, and violent, and Kwaio continue to be feared and reviled by
many Solomon Islanders and Europeans on plantations and in towns.
Kwaio themselves generally distrust outsiders. Memories of the punitive
expedition’s outrages are fresh, and elders emotionally recount narratives
of atrocities committed against their families, homes, and ancestors.
Younger people have listened to such accounts throughout their lives, and
these historical events are at the heart of modern Kwaio identity. When
younger Kwaio friends met my wife in 1992 they took their first opportu-
nity alone with her to try to explain who they, the Kwaio, were. They
began by recounting the horrors of the 1927 attack and the government’s
cruel response.
The animosity and distrust produced by these events have contributed
significantly to the Kwaio mountains being the least developed area of the
Solomons. The government provides no services there and, relative to other
Solomon Islanders, the people make little effort to integrate with the rest
of the country. They are typically perceived to be conservative, isolationist,
and confrontational, and there is a large element of truth in this. Certainly
the most common Kwaio stance toward government over the years has
been one of defiance. And yet, most Kwaio desire greater participation in
the larger world, and want certain kinds of development, education, and
medical care for their communities and children (see Akin 1994). They
have communicated these wishes to the government since at least the
1940s, though often in association with demands for more political
autonomy. As I shall show, Kwaio ambivalence toward the government
and their own place in the greater Solomons is key to understanding their
current compensation demands.
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The Kwaio compensation claims have generated considerable commentary.
They have been portrayed as cynical political manipulations (Daubo 1984;
Fifi‘i 1989; Keesing 1992, 157–158ff), as nonsensical and ill-conceived
(Keesing 1983; 1986), and as instigated by irresponsible anthropologists
and Peace Corps volunteers (‘Isika 1984; Pacific Islands Monthly 1985, 53;
Wintle 1988, 232–243). Most attention has focused on three aspects of
the issue that I believe have precluded an accurate assessment of the
claims. I now briefly summarize these and explain why they are not cen-
tral to my own analysis.
First, the Keesing and Corris book (1980) sparked tremendous contro-
versy. It informed many Solomon Islanders for the first time of the puni-
tive expedition’s brutality. Some blamed the book for kindling Kwaio
anger and provoking their compensation demands and called for it to be
banned. Others even accused Keesing of personally organizing or instigat-
ing Kwaio actions, and he felt compelled to defend himself and the book
against these charges in newspapers, radio interviews, and academic pub-
lications (eg, 1983; 1986; 1990; 1992).
I was living in Kwaio throughout much of the period when people were
formulating their original claims (1979–1983), and in no way was Kee-
sing involved. Kwaio neither read his book nor showed much interest in
it. Suggestions that I and my former wife were responsible for the Kwaio
demands are equally baseless and fatuous (eg, Freed quoted in Wintle
1988, 235). Unlike other Solomon Islanders, Kwaio had never forgotten
the atrocities of 1927 and they needed no outside encouragement to pursue
compensation.
A second sensationalized feature of this controversy has been the astro-
nomical sum of money demanded in the most publicized claim, over
si$300 billion. Nearly everything written on the topic emphasizes the ab-
surdity of this amount, often using it to discredit the very idea of a Kwaio
claim. However, only one person calculated this figure, a secretary to the
“paramount chief” of the local kastom political council, described later. It
bore little relation to the goals or expectations of the Kwaio men and
women seeking compensation, for whom such a figure was meaningless
(compare Filer 1990, 96).
Third, this same paramount chief, Folofo‘u, was able to capitalize on
frustration over government inaction regarding the claim to foment a
boycott of national elections. This provoked a serious political crisis and
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frontation was primarily blamed on the Kwaio compensation demands
not having been met, and the claim itself was widely represented by out-
siders as a provocative and militant act. But most Kwaio who had worked
toward filing the compensation claims did not take part in the incident,
and of those who did, most had not been seeking confrontation when
they developed their claims. On the contrary, as I shall explain, many
Kwaio hoped compensation might inaugurate a new era of more peaceful
coexistence and perhaps even beneficial cooperation with the government.
A Brief History of the Compensation Claims
By the late 1970s (long before publication of Keesing and Corris’s book)
several parties were floating the idea of submitting a compensation claim
for the punitive expedition’s actions. While it is not clear where the idea
originated, at least some early proposals were made by government-
educated Christians. Kwaio Member of Parliament Jonathan Fifi‘i made
inquiries with British government representatives while he was in England
in 1977, and claims were later suggested by a young political activist in
Honiara and by a government council member (Fifi‘i 1988 personal com-
munication; Keesing 1992, 158).
The claim was also a regular topic at gatherings of the eastern Kwaio
political council, called the Fadanga (or “meeting”). By 1981 communi-
ties throughout the mountains, only loosely coordinated by the Fadanga,
began compiling lists of offenses committed in their areas by the soldiers.
For example, the following claim was voiced in 1982 by Ruita, an elderly
survivor of the punitive expedition, and recorded by his nephew. Ruita,
now deceased, was from the ‘Ai‘eda territory, home of the warrior Basiana
who organized and led the attack on Bell’s party.
I, Ruita, am the priest for all of the shrines at ‘Ai‘eda, and Waneagea is the
chief over the land at ‘Ai‘eda. During the time of our grandparents, the living
was good. Then in 1927 the law destroyed our way of living. You Govern-
ment, you climbed up here with your army and you destroyed my place of
‘Ai‘eda! Your army climbed up and shot ten people here! Twenty people died
in all. A second thing of mine they spoiled, they raped the women here! Third,
they desecrated my shrines, my thirty shrines of ‘Ai‘eda! Fourth, they
destroyed thirty sacred pigs here. Fifth, you burned forty houses! Sixth, the six
sacred ritual bundles of my place of ‘Ai‘eda were burned! Seventh, they
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Eighth, they burned two sets of slit-gongs! Ninth, they burned the sacred pan-
pipes! And there were twenty sacred dance sticks! Tenth, there were forty
carved pudding bowls they ruined. Eleventh, they set fire to the menstrual huts
and the smoke rose above our tabu places. They destroyed my living!
(Recorded in the Kwaio language; my translation).
Many claims were simply lists of people killed and items destroyed. The
general idea was that they would all be presented together to officials in
Honiara, who would then either negotiate compensation directly with the
Kwaio or help the Kwaio obtain payment from England. In the early 1980s
most Kwaio made only hazy distinctions between the Solomon Islands
and late British administrations. Some, however, recognized in the coun-
try’s new independence a significant political transition and an opportunity
to reformulate relations with the government. This is likely the most sig-
nificant factor in why Kwaio chose this particular historical moment to
pursue their claims, after more than fifty years of silent resentment.
In 1984 a Kwaio delegation formally presented typed copies of the lists
to the government in Honiara (Solomon Star, 22 June). Paramount Chief
Folofo‘u and his clerk (both now deceased) controlled calculation of the
amount demanded and orchestrated its presentation. Although most Kwaio
strongly supported making some claim, Folofo‘u decided how this partic-
ular effort would proceed, skillfully using prohibitive religious curses to
stifle dissent. This is important because Folofo‘u’s claim and its outcome
received the attention of commentators and the press. Most of the origi-
nal lists of damage were compiled by individual bush kin groups, not by
“Christian scribes” (Keesing 1990, 292) or by Folofo‘u and his clerk (Fifi‘i
1989, 157–158; Keesing 1992, 160–161). It was, by and large, a popular
project propelled by highly motivated mountain pagans. Their perspec-
tives, which were lost in the political turmoil, are what most concern me
in this paper.
Subsequent inaction by the Solomon Islands Government enabled Folo-
fo‘u to organize a Kwaio boycott of the national elections, and over the
next two years government officials met with him and various delegations
to seek a settlement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1985) presented the
claim to the British High Commissioner, but London refused to consider
it, citing the length of time that had passed and asserting that the punitive
expedition was “a lawful action” (British High Commission 1985). At
least once, a token sum of money was proffered by the Solomons govern-
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projects be located in Kwaio in lieu of a monetary payment. All offers
were refused.
Matters came to a head in 1986, when the government tried to force
the long-delayed election by opening polling places under armed guard.
Under Folofo‘u’s direction several men used force to disrupt voting at
Sinalagu Harbour, sparking a violent confrontation with heavily armed
riot police that nearly ended in disaster. Afterward, many people declared
that Folofo‘u had almost provoked another tragedy like that of 1927, and
his credibility crumbled. Nevertheless, by mid-1987 people had started
putting together a new and more moderate compensation claim, point-
edly barring Folofo‘u’s participation. People refused his calls to meetings,
and he died relatively powerless in early 1992.3
Currently, compensation demands occupy a political back burner while
Kwaio leaders pursue government ratification of a code of kastom laws
and compensations that they seek to enforce locally (see Akin 1993, 514–
553). Nevertheless, the claim will certainly resurface as a key political issue,
and many consider compensation payment a prerequisite for future coop-
eration with the government.
Rudiments of Kwaio Compensation
To analyze the Bell compensation claims one must understand several
general themes fundamental to Malaitan compensation and how they are
being played out on the national political stage. Kwaio recognize six dis-
tinct named types of compensation: for sexual trespass, theft, desecrating
someone’s ancestors, insults or infringements of personal or group rights,
causing injury, and causing death. These categories are not mutually ex-
clusive, and people may demand more than one kind of compensation for
a single act. The punitive expedition committed all of these types of
offenses, and compensation has been demanded for them all, but here I
summarize only compensation for death and desecration. The murders
and religious defilation by the punitive expedition are emphasized most
by the Kwaio when discussing why the government must compensate
them. I also outline some broader liability concepts particularly relevant
to this claim.
When a person’s actions result in another’s death, compensation called
firitaa must be paid to the deceased’s family. In many situations this must
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give a classic Melanesian example, if a Kwaio person suffers a fatal fall on
the way to a feast, the sponsors of the feast must pay death compensa-
tion, despite the fact that individuals are never personally invited to
Kwaio feasts. The explicit logic is that if the hosts had not held the event,
the person would not have been walking where the mishap occurred. The
hosts are also responsible for any other misfortunes that occur at, or in
consequence of, the feast. This and related notions of causality and liabil-
ity have often seemed unfair or illogical to foreign observers.
This is not to say that Kwaio are unconcerned with intent, which is
critically important in decisions about how much death compensation to
demand. Sometimes roundabout ways are found to return all or part of
the payment if there was clearly no culpability or negligence. For in-
stance, the family might ask a blameless payer to bury the deceased, for
which service they would give a large payment. What is important in such
cases is that the compensator recognizes the survivors’ right to receive ap-
propriate compensation. The payment constitutes a public acknowledg-
ment and enactment of social equality (compare Goldman 1993).
Intentional murder is another matter entirely and requires a much dif-
ferent response. Most important here is that, not only must living rela-
tives receive compensation in murder cases, but payment is also required
by the ancestral spirits that were propitiated by the victim (and also the
victim’s own spirit). The family of the deceased will sacrifice pigs to each
spirit, pigs that the murderers or their kin should contribute or pay for. If
this very expensive procedure is not followed, the ancestors will punish
their descendants for any subsequent social intercourse with the killers or
their close kin. Ancestral anger will subside only after those responsible
pay the wergild or someone is killed in revenge.
If a death compensation remains unsettled, ancestors may continue to
prohibit their descendants from socializing with the murderer’s descen-
dants even into future generations. As an example, in 1982 the proposed
location for a locally run school had to be changed because of an uncom-
pensated killing two generations before. The schoolteacher was descended
from the victim, and the site was on land of the murderer’s descendants.
People feared that the teacher’s ancestors would kill or otherwise harm
him if he resided there.
A different sort of compensation, siunga (literally “washing”), must be
given to ritually purify ancestors when their prescriptive or proscriptive
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When a person angers another’s ancestors, that person must pay for the
sacrificial pigs to compensate and “wash” the spirit. The spirit will hold
only its own descendants accountable for the infraction, but they, in turn,
hold the violator accountable. Thus siunga often is collected, initially, as a
secular compensation and then converted into sacrificial pigs to compen-
sate ancestors.4 For accidental desecrations most Kwaio consider it im-
proper to demand more compensation than is needed to buy these pigs.
Intentional desecrations (like those of the punitive expedition) are a dif-
ferent matter; much more is always required to cleanse the insult to both
the living descendants and the spirits. The living will demand additional
payment if it is determined that angry ancestors have already inflicted mis-
fortunes on them as a consequence of the desecration.
To understand these and other Kwaio compensation transactions it is
crucial to appreciate their inherently dual nature. Demanding compensa-
tion is simultaneously an act of aggression and of reconciliation. When
relatives of an injured party descend on a hamlet to demand compensa-
tion they may be heavily armed and belligerent. The compensation is
sometimes “negotiated” under explicit threats of violence by the claim-
ants, which hamlet residents and their allies may reciprocate. If the claims
are rejected outright claimants might attack someone in the hamlet or go
on a rampage of property destruction. Nevertheless, the usual goal of those
claiming compensation, particularly death compensation, is not only to
assert their rights and strength, but also to restore some social stability and
at least a semblance of peaceful coexistence with the party of the offender.
Most compensation negotiations do not end in violence. Indeed, princi-
pals in the dispute may be absent, represented by relatives uninvolved in
the events at issue. Negotiations often take place between older people
working to correct a problem caused by impetuous younger kin. Yet, even
here, the threat of violence (if satisfactory payment is not forthcoming) is
at least implicit in the proceedings. Because of this, compensation discus-
sions often are tense, and participants sometimes are unsure whether all
will culminate in speeches of friendship or a violent brawl. One thing is
certain: until compensation is offered and accepted, normal relations be-
tween the groups will be impossible. I have more to say about this aspect
of compensation later.
Kwaio conceptions of ancestral death compensation must be under-
stood in order to comprehend the tenacity of ongoing claims against the
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generally focus on how the soldiers disrupted local relations with ances-
tors through their killings and desecrations. Kwaio believe that this has
caused a steady decline in the quality of their lives since 1927. They be-
lieve their ancestors remain angry because the expedition’s crimes were
never compensated. This idea is not new; as early as 1939 a district officer
reported Kwaio openly blaming community problems on ancestral anger
over the punitive expedition, and this belief was surely current immedi-
ately after the attack as well (Akin 1993, 230–234). Many Kwaio main-
tain that initiation of better relations will be impossible unless the gov-
ernment pays a sizable compensation for the ancestors to see. This is one
reason why they reject government offers of development projects instead
of monetary compensation. While government officials hope to avoid ap-
pearances of paying compensation, for many Kwaio the act of public pay-
ment is more important than the money itself.
Compensation in Historical and Political Perspective
Most Kwaio want more than simple compensation for the outrages of
1927. By their claims they are demanding that the government recognize
compensation itself as a proper means of resolving serious disputes, and,
by extension, their right to manage their own legal affairs. Compensation
has acquired for Kwaio and other Malaitans tremendous political signifi-
cance beyond its legal role. To understand this it is necessary to revisit
past judicial policies of colonial and postcolonial governments, and of
Malaita’s Christian churches.
Most Malaitans ignored European laws during the first decades of
colonial rule except when laboring abroad, but by 1928 the entire island
was under British control. In the years that followed, colonial officers
worked with very limited success to devise and enforce a workable
Malaitan legal policy. Through the 1930s, most Malaitans were ambiva-
lent about the new “government law.” While many welcomed the end of
blood feuding, others wished to return to settling their own disputes,
through force if necessary, and British law became widely resented as an
alien imposition. One of Ian Hogbin’s north Malaitan informants, a
former warrior, explained this to him in 1933: “You are familiar with the
Law. It belongs to you: It comes from the place where you were born. For
us the Law is different. In olden times we behaved as our fathers did
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did I do that, have I not replied, ‘It is the custom; my fathers did it of
old?’ To-day that is changed. The white man has come and tells us we
must behave like his father. Our own fathers, we must forget them” (Anin-
gari in Hogbin 1970, 153).
Many Malaitans were furious at the British prohibition of killing to
punish serious moral transgressions, particularly adultery, and also at the
lack of attention British officers were giving to compensation. Bita Saetana
(Peter Satan) served briefly as a government appointed “chief” at Sinalagu
in the mid-1940s and recalled to me in 1981 how Kwaio observed the
government courts with dismay: “Under the government before, if you
discovered who had stolen your pig you wouldn’t get any compensation.
‘Take him to jail for two months.’ Somebody committed adultery with
your wife and it was found out? ‘You go to jail for just a year. Or six
months. You can’t compensate with shell money.’ That’s something that
was making our people very angry in those days.”
But in fact government courts did recognize the legitimacy of some
compensation payments. Officers from Bell onward realized that compen-
sation was absolutely necessary for maintaining peace on Malaita. Yet
there were difficulties. How would officers treat compensation demands
for acts that were not criminal under British law? Would Malaitans be
allowed to settle serious crimes with compensation alone? Was it double
jeopardy for a community to make a person pay compensation who was
also sentenced to jail by the government? How could district officers assure
proper distribution of compensations awarded in their courts when they
did not understand the complex social networks, histories, or subtle prin-
ciples involved?
The government responded with several strategies, all unsatisfactory to
most Malaitans. One was the adoption of a category of “custom law” to
use to settle disputes without invoking British criminal or civil law. Some
officers found it best to handle as many disputes as possible as “custom
cases,” but the approach generated other difficulties. Malaitan culture, old
or new, was an enigma to government officers. Their realization of their
own cultural ignorance, combined with a severe shortage of European per-
sonnel (two British officers to some fifty thousand Malaitans scattered
through rugged country), led them to delegate more legal authority to
government-appointed headmen. This diminished the problem of arbitra-
tor ignorance, but it granted judicial power to men who were sometimes
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legal roles of community leaders and generally undermined their authority.
A more fundamental problem for the policy of applying “custom law”
in government courts was that it was predicated on an assumption that a
timeless, enduring, and pre-European “native custom” existed that could
be isolated and authenticated for legal purposes. This notion clashed with
the reality that, by the 1930s, Malaitans had been interacting with Euro-
peans for over sixty years, and local cultures had changed in ways un-
known to district officers and even to most Malaitans.
Although some government officers did allow and even order compen-
sation in their own and their headmen’s courts, they did so in ways that
angered many Malaitans. First, they commonly limited compensation in
theft cases to the value of the stolen property. Malaitan theft compensa-
tions were usually several times the value of property taken, but the gov-
ernment rejected such punitive claims. District officers also ordered the
return of any compensations obtained by threat of force and imprisoned
those who collected them. Serious offenses, especially murder and assault,
were always prosecuted as violations of British criminal law, and in such
cases courts often ignored compensation or disallowed it. Officers often
quashed compensation collected on the basis of indigenous principles of
strict liability such as those discussed earlier. Finally, district officers often
gave little or no consideration to evidence considered damning by
Malaitans, while granting serious weight to testimony the community
found irrelevant. G E D Sandars, who headed Malaita’s administration for
most of 1933–1946, commented, “What they consider proof, and in
many cases they are probably right, cannot be accepted as evidence in
court” (1937, 18).
More generally, Malaitans reacted negatively to the western tendency
to treat disputes as simply dyadic in nature rather than as conflicts
immersed in relations between groups, or episodes within long-term rela-
tionships. While Malaitans typically absorbed disputes within broader
social networks, British law attempted to isolate them from the same.
Lacking the social and cultural knowledge to distribute compensations to
appropriate parties, district officers had little choice but to award them to
individuals. For these and other reasons Kwaio and many other Malaitans
found government courts, and particularly their approach to compensa-
tion, highly unsatisfactory, and they therefore settled disputes privately
whenever they could.5
50 the contemporary pacific • spring 1999Through the 1930s and early 1940s colonial law became the dominant
symbol of dissatisfaction with government rule throughout Malaita. In
1944 and 1945 this came to the fore with the rise of the Maasina Rule
movement. Centered on Malaita, Maasina Rule eventually brought colo-
nial administration to a standstill throughout much of the southeastern
Solomons for several years. A paramount goal of the movement was the
codification of “kastom law” and the formation of “kastom courts” to
supplant the colonial legal system. Compensation was to be the primary
means of settling disputes and punishing crimes, except that (most people
advocated) murderers would be handed over to the government. Eventu-
ally the government imprisoned Maasina Rule’s leaders on charges stem-
ming from their alleged operation of illegal courts.
After Maasina Rule was suppressed, the symbolic opposition of kastom
law to government law remained a leading theme of ongoing Malaitan
political resistance ideologies. Beginning in the 1950s, the government
gradually increased the powers of its local-level courts, and compensation
became more integrated into the legal system. Nonetheless, many of the
complaints about courts just recounted continued to be heard, and no-
where more strongly than in eastern Kwaio. For many years Kwaio in the
mountains selectively used the courts, only to reject them completely in
the 1970s.
The period from 1979–1981 is important for understanding subsequent
Kwaio demands for government compensation because at this time Kwaio
began seriously formulating their claims. When I arrived on Malaita in
1979, the central issue dividing the government and the Kwaio remained
the latter’s refusal to recognize the state legal system. Once again, the con-
flict was framed in terms of Kwaio compensation versus government
punitive measures. This became the pivotal controversy through which
Kwaio and government representatives argued the broader question of
how to balance local autonomy with governmental authority.
In 1979 the Kwaio Fadanga council was allowing assault cases to be
handled through compensation alone and was preventing government
interference.6 From the government’s perspective this allowed dangerous
criminals to buy their way out of punishment. Some officials expressed
willingness to allow compensation if criminal penalties also were im-
posed, while others argued that inflicting compensations in addition to
government sanctions was unfair. Many Kwaio rejected both stances with
a similar double-jeopardy argument of their own, insisting that no one
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ing to allow the arrest of murderers, but more conservative antigovern-
ment factions in the community wanted even killings handled internally,
as a friend explained to me with a mock lecture to the government: “We
don’t like the way the government punishes murderers without any com-
pensation. We could die if ancestors are not given pigs after a killing. You,
government! This man didn’t kill one of your relatives. So why do you
want to take him? He killed my relative, so let me punish him so my
anger will be finished. This man he killed wasn’t even related to you”
(Wa‘ifurina 1982).
These legal issues, along with Kwaio refusal to pay taxes, prompted an
unprecedented coastal visit to the area by Prime Minister Kenilorea in
1980. Although he hoped to convince Kwaio of the futility of resisting
government law, his visit instead highlighted the opposition between gov-
ernment and Kwaio positions. Lecturing his audience about crime and
punishment, Kenilorea explained that compensation was meant for indi-
vidual victims, while prison terms and fines were punishment to compen-
sate society as a whole. Both were important, but society’s interests had to
take precedence over those of individuals. Unimpressed, audience mem-
bers informed him testily that compensation is divided among the rele-
vant segments of society; others have no place being compensated when
they have not been wronged.
This controversy has continued unresolved into the 1990s and Kwaio
continue to exclude government courts from their mountains. Although
violence is relatively rare, armed parties manage many serious disputes,
demanding compensation according to indigenous principles. Intimidation
is similarly used by Kwaio and other Malaitans to collect compensations
in town. Of course, this is all highly illegal under government law, and in
1986 the Solomons chief justice warned that he would hand down severe
sentences for offenders (whom he called “gangs of thugs”). In an ironic
sanitizing of “custom” he declared, “Genuine requests for compensation
must be settled by proper customary means through the chiefs or elders”
(Solomon Nius, 20 Nov).
For all that, in practice the government has made little effort to inter-
fere with internal Kwaio disputes. There is no government presence in the
bush, and police are loath to go there, particularly to make arrests. On
Malaita as a whole, in fact, government local courts have been little used
since the 1980s. Instead, community-run “chiefs’ courts” have applied
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selves. For example, in 1988 police in the entire southern half of Malaita
(Kwaio, ‘Are‘are, and Small Malaita) recorded only thirty reports of
offenses. In 1986, local courts on the entire island, by then home to some
seventy thousand people, reportedly heard a mere 104 cases. By compari-
son, during the previous year local courts in the country’s Western Prov-
ince, with a much smaller population, heard 901 cases (Naitoro 1990, 21).
After residing on Malaita from 1995–1997, my impression is that more
recent statistics would be even more striking. Most Malaitans continue to
perceive local courts much as they were described in 1985 by ‘Are‘are
parliamentarian and lawyer (and son of Maasina Rule’s founder) Andrew
Nori, as “foreign creatures dressed in local costumes” (Solomon Star, nd).
Compensation and Christian Churches
In many respects Kwaio society is polarized between mountain pagans
and coastal Christians (see Akin 1993; Keesing 1989; 1992). One conten-
tious issue that divides them is that the area’s two largest churches pro-
hibit members from paying or receiving compensation. While many Chris-
tians have supported the claims against the government, those most active
in formulating and making them have been pagans. An important motiva-
tion for many of these pagans is that, if the government pays, it will be a
symbolic blow to those Christian leaders who oppose compensation as a
means of settling disputes.
This controversy dates back nearly one hundred years in the Solomons.
The first church to spread throughout Malaita was the South Sea Evan-
gelical Mission founded by Australian missionaries and their Malaitan
converts. The mission’s leaders preached that true conversion required
radical abandonment of indigenous cultures and adoption of a church-
prescribed Christian lifestyle. They sought to overthrow local political
structures and replace them with a loose network of church-trained
“teachers.” To this end, they attacked not only the ancestral religions but
also the legal and economic institutions through which local leaders exer-
cised their power, particularly brideprice and compensation payments.
Today in Kwaio members of both the South Sea Evangelical Church
(ssec) and its rival, the Seventh Day Adventists, are taught that they must
forgo compensation. Instead, Christians should forgive each other for
wrongs, sometimes through ritual reconciliation involving public confes-
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contrast to the ancestral system, Christians who break religious rules need
not sacrifice compensatory pigs, but only confess and pray for God’s for-
giveness. The ssec also has a long history of fierce resistance to govern-
ment control, and this “harmony ideology” evolved partly to minimize
both government and pagan interference in Christian disputes (see Nader
1990).
Most Kwaio Christians conceptually differentiate sacred “God’s law”
from secular “church law,” but boundaries tend to be ambiguous and
people often are unsure where particular rules fall. Some Christians per-
ceive every violation of church policy as a religious infraction and there-
fore treat payment of compensation as an offense punishable by God. A
case from my field notes illustrates problems such ambiguity can trigger:
In 1980 a teenage boy propositioned a girl in their ssec village. When
she reported this to her relatives the boy struck her. Three of the girl’s
relatives, two pagans and one Christian, demanded compensation, for
both the proposition and the assault. The boy’s father reluctantly paid
three shell money valuables and si$10. Six weeks later the boy’s infant
cousin died. Several Christians declared the baby’s death God’s punish-
ment for the compensation payment. The baby’s family announced their
refusal to bury the corpse until the recipients of the previous compensa-
tion paid them a death compensation of five shell valuables. During nego-
tiations, the father who had paid the original compensation had to be
restrained from attacking with a machete the pagans who had claimed it.
Church leaders met and decided that no compensation should be paid for
the infant’s death because first, the prohibition against paying sexual
compensation was not God’s law but rather church law, so God had not
killed the baby as punishment; and second, collecting death compensation
was against God’s law because “none was paid for the death of Jesus.”
Compensation disputes with pagans are common, particularly when
Christians charged with offenses refuse to compensate their pagan accusers.
However, although pagans and Christians sometimes use the compensation
issue against each other as a blunt rhetorical weapon, in practice compen-
sation remains controversial even in Christian communities. Many other-
wise pious Christians pay and collect compensations despite continual ad-
monishments, and sometimes church expulsions, by conservative church
leaders. Church authorities throughout Malaita find compensation prohi-
bitions to be among their most difficult rules to enforce (see eg, Burt 1994,
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conflicts over compensation within the churches, and the deeply rooted
antigovernment sentiments of the Christian community, it is little surprise
that the claims against the government have received support from so
many Kwaio Christians, even though many pagans perceived them as
having an anti-Christian component.
The tenacity of the practice of compensation in the face of both govern-
ment legal pressures and Christian doctrines reflects, in part, a common
Malaitan ethnopsychological conception that compensation is more than
merely an alternative means of dispute resolution. It is often portrayed in
a naturalistic way: dangerous negative emotions are inevitably aroused
when one is seriously wronged, and these can only be assuaged by com-
pensation or, alternatively, direct retribution. From this perspective, wrongs
cannot truly be righted by simple forgiveness, or government-imposed
fines or imprisonment (see Schieffelin 1985; Strathern 1993, 218–227;
White 1985).
Compensation, Equivalence, and Ambivalence in 
Government Relations
I noted in my introduction that the Kwaio case exemplifies a broader pat-
tern in postcolonial Melanesia of tribal groups attempting to reformulate
their relationships with young state governments. I have shown that on
Malaita the right to political equality with, and autonomy from, the gov-
ernment has long been a central theme in kastom political ideologies. The
Kwaio demands for government compensation for the 1927 punitive expe-
dition are a vigorous assertion of these rights, superseding the passive
Kwaio resistance to government control that typified the final decades of
colonial rule. The Kwaio claims aim to settle more than the crimes of
1927; they seek to employ the issue to establish a new association with
the government that will allow them to retain their independence, but
also afford them access to government channels to power and wealth.
For Kwaio, the compensation demands are ideal for pursuing this
political agenda for two reasons. The most obvious is the political mean-
ing compensation itself has acquired since the 1920s. Throughout Malaita
the government’s reluctance to permit its application as in the past, and
insistence on the primacy of western-style judicial punishments for seri-
ous offenses, propelled compensation to prominence as a marker of legal
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ernment itself pay compensation to the Kwaio is ironic and, for Kwaio,
compelling.
This irony is compounded because the 1927 punitive expedition was
the historical moment at which the government first imposed its law.
Indeed, Bell’s clash with the warrior who killed him, Basiana, has become
a potent metaphor for conflicts between government law and Kwaio law.
Ma‘aanamae, a leader in the movement to claim compensation (but op-
posed to Paramount Chief Folofo‘u’s activities) presented this to me in
1980:
That’s how the killing [of Bell] happened, because he tried to bring his own
law here and use it to put an end to kastom law. Then government came again
and arrested Basiana and others who killed and took them away and hung
them. The government wanted kastom to be finished. And Basiana, he had
wanted the government to be finished. That’s what the two of them were
thinking. And that is why the two of them killed each other, why they took
Basiana and hung him. But how is kastom going to be finished? It’s still here
today. And the law, even though they killed Mister Bell, how is it going to be
finished? It’s still here. So although the law stands today, so, too, does kastom
stand today. They wanted it to be finished, but no.7
By paying compensation the government would not only redress the
wrongs of the punitive expedition. For Kwaio, payment would also con-
stitute a resounding public acknowledgment of their right to employ com-
pensation and “kastom law” more generally to manage their own legal
affairs.
The second reason the compensation demand is well suited for ap-
proaching the government is that the act of demanding compensation
embodies for Kwaio the very tensions present in their own stances toward
government. As I have shown, ambivalence is intrinsic to compensation
interactions within local Kwaio disputes. A claim can be simultaneously
an aggressive demand for public recognition of status and rights and also
a proposal for normalized relations. And, as I’ve noted, Kwaio views of
government also tend to be ambivalent and even contradictory. While op-
posing government control, most Kwaio also recognize their own margin-
alization in the Solomons. For all the Kwaio reputation for fierce resis-
tance, in the past fifty years the government has made few direct threats
against them. The main government response to their defiance has been
56 the contemporary pacific • spring 1999to ignore them. Consequently, one finds in the mountains no government
schools, medical services, or development projects, and few Kwaio from
there hold positions of influence in the government or in business abroad.
Devotion to ancestors and commitment to local autonomy often clash with
growing desires for foreign things and political engagement. Although
much kastom rhetoric is passionately defiant and isolationist (eg, Akin
1996; Keesing 1992), the concrete actions of many kastom political leaders
have been geared not toward simple resistance but rather to finding reso-
lutions to this dilemma.
This ambivalence is an important reason why compensation claims
against the government receive such wide support. They unite Kwaio at
opposite ends of the political spectrum by appealing to both those favor-
ing more radical confrontation with, or rejection of, the government, and
those who advocate reconciliation and cooperation. Most Kwaio, in fact,
maintain sympathies with both positions, and the scenario of a compen-
sation claim offers them a means to pursue both ends concurrently with-
out apparent inconsistency.
The desire for more cooperative ties with the government was evident
in public statements Kwaio made at the time of even the most confronta-
tional claim led by Folofo‘u. Early radio reports stressed that Kwaio rep-
resentatives were demanding not only compensation, but also that the
government pay more attention to Kwaio problems and give them more
government representation (sibc radio, 6–9 Nov 1984). During a meeting
at that time with the prime minister about the compensation, the presi-
dent of the Kwaio Fadanga told a story about a father who banished his
true son and adopted another. The adopted son was treated well while the
true son lived a poor, lonely life. Every time the true son tried to come
home he was banished again. The president then asked the prime min-
ister, “You have adopted the ways and thinking of the white people and
now the true son is standing before you, why do you keep banishing
him?” The desire for at least partial reconciliation also underlies Ma‘aa-
namae’s statement, which exhibits a willingness to coexist with the govern-
ment and its laws. That these Kwaio claims amount to more than meets
the eye will surprise no one familiar with compensation in Melanesia,
where claims are commonly employed to broach broader issues dividing
groups.
The Kwaio compensation demands are not the only ones that Malaitans
have made on the Solomons government in recent years. Most promi-
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us$65,000) to compensate Malaita’s entire population for an obscene
anti-Malaitan sign in the Honiara market, supposedly placed there by
Polynesians from Bellona. The payment, extorted by thousands of
Malaitan men (relatively few of whom were Kwaio) marching and in
some cases rioting and looting in Honiara’s streets, was divided among
Malaita’s area councils. Several Malaitan leaders, including at least one
parliamentarian, were prime instigators of the action.
In 1996 Honiara shook again as Malaitans demonstrated in the streets
and then looted Chinese stores. This time they were demanding that the
government compensate them for curses made against Malaita by Reef
Islanders at a Honiara nightclub. After several days of high tension, well-
organized petrol-bomb manufacture, and threats to burn Honiara to the
ground, the government once more capitulated. Money was paid from the
country’s Community Development Fund to both the Malaitan and ReefPhoto 2. John Fiisango (smiling, on right), Member of Parliament for East
Kwaio, formally accepts compensation on behalf of Malaita from his Reef Island
counterpart, Michael Maina, on 2 February 1996. (Courtesy of Solomon Star)
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(photo 2). Protesters cited the 1989 compensation as precedent, and this
scenario will likely be replayed, perhaps with tragic consequences.
When compensation extends into the complexities of national politics,
analysis becomes more challenging. While an in-depth assessment of the
Honiara compensations is far beyond the scope of this paper, I shall close
by briefly noting similarities they share with the Kwaio claims. These epi-
sodes cannot be understood at face value any more than can the Bell com-
pensation claims. Many factors were involved, including ethnic tensions,
rampant urban unemployment, and a growing “rascal” (youth crime) sub-
culture in Honiara (see Jourdan 1995). Underlying them all, however, is
enduring Malaitan discontent with government behavior, much of it
rooted in the same politico-historical processes I have described here. The
1996 riots began as a march on government offices, and violence and
looting erupted only when riot police blocked marchers from entering the
main downtown area. For many of those involved, the action was a polit-
ical demonstration, but, because the protest crystallized around the scenario
of a compensation demand, violence probably was inevitable once police
stopped the claim presentation. It should be noted too, that for some
younger men the event was an excuse to wreak havoc. Yet such motiva-
tions are difficult to disentangle from the growing frustrations of unem-
ployed youths in Honiara, who typically blame the government for their
situation. Of course many Malaitans, even some with very strong anti-
government political ideas, stongly opposed and condemned the violence.
In a formal “peace ceremony” where the compensations were paid out,
Maenaa‘adi, a Kwaio pagan leader engaged in the negotiations (but not
in the street action) was invited to speak as a “custom chief.” After voic-
ing complaints that many Malaitans have against the government, he
linked the riots to the degeneration of Honiara culture, citing the ubiquity
of alcohol, nightclubbing, and violent movies: “Who is responsible for
bringing all these things here?” he asked rhetorically. “The government of
course, so it has to be held responsible for the problems associated with
it” (Solomon Star, 2 Feb 1996). The subtext of these statements was a
contrasting of the government, mired in decadence, with the moral supe-
riority of Malaitan kastom.
Maenaa‘adi and many of the protesters creatively applied Malaitan lia-
bility principles (in ways that some other Malaitans privately rejected as
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givers, to use our previous example, are liable for misfortunes befalling
those who attend the social events they create, so too the government is
liable for trouble that occurs in Honiara because the town is a govern-
ment creation. “If the government had not built Honiara, young men
would not be drawn there and problems such as those that sparked the
curses would not occur” (Maenaa‘adi 1996 personal communication).
Just as Kwaio are seeking more than monetary payment in their com-
pensation claims for the punitive expedition, deeper political issues under-
lie the actions of the Malaitans in Honiara. The Solomons government
currently suffers from what Robert Gordon and Mervyn Meggitt described
for Papua New Guinea in the mid-1980s as a “crisis of internal legiti-
macy” (1985, 190–209). This is most notable among rural people, who
make up the vast majority of Solomon Islanders. Conspicuous declines in
the economy and infrastructure, combined with rife political corruption,
lead many to advocate alternative means of governing the nation, or at
least their own areas. This is particularly so on Malaita with its long his-
tory of antigovernment sentiments and movements.
Among Malaitans, as in Papua New Guinea, legal issues are central to
the critique of government (Gordon and Meggitt 1985). But, unlike
Papua New Guinea, law has not come to the political fore for Malaitans
because of a radical breakdown of law and order, although crime is a
problem in Honiara. For Malaitans (and to various degrees other Solo-
mon Islanders) the underlying debate is one of defining terms on which
to base future government, and a central issue is the extent to which
they will control their own island. For many, these questions have always
been first and foremost a struggle between “government law” and
“kastom law.”
The antigovernment emphasis of Malaitan kastom ideologies differen-
tiates them from those where kastom is employed as a more subtle form
of politico-economic enclavement (eg, Foster 1995a) or as a less conten-
tious mediation of old and new ways (eg, White 1991; 1993). Kastom has
played similar roles to these on Malaita, of course (eg, Akin nd). There, as
everywhere, kastom is an extremely multivalent concept that exhibits sig-
nificant variation both within and between different parts of the island.
Malaita is far from united politically, and divergent models of kastom are
as often used to highlight atomism as solidarity. Furthermore, young
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reshaping kastom to suit their urban lives, sometimes in ways that dimin-
ish their elders’ control over them (see Jourdan 1995). Nevertheless, for
most Malaitans, kastom as ideology has never completely lost its antigov-
ernment grounding, and for many this common theme is returning to the
fore as dissatisfaction with the state grows. Their shared discontent is
what has inspired normally rivalrous Malaitans to undertake highly coor-
dinated actions on Honiara’s streets. In some other parts of the Solomons,
too, with increasing political disillusionment, kastom politics is exhibiting
a more oppositional character.
Ironically, this rise in the antigovernment tone of kastom politics is
occurring at the same time as elements within the government are attempt-
ing to elevate kastom’s role, both within government policy and as a basis
of what has thus far been an elusive, shared ideology for nation making
(Foster 1995b). Even compensation is being employed as a national sym-
bol. For example, in 1994, the government formally accepted a compen-
sation of si$1.5 million from Papua New Guinea for deaths and destruc-
tion suffered in border incursions during the Bougainville crisis. At a leaf
“chief’s house” on the National Museum grounds, Solomons Prime Min-
ister Saemala ceremonially reciprocated with pigs, shell money, and betel
nuts “in the true spirit of Melanesian brotherhood” (Solomon Star, 16
and 23 Mar). Yet relative to Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, colonial
and postcolonial Solomon Islands governments have historically been less
sympathetic to kastom. Their reluctance to legitimate kastom reflects sev-
eral factors, including the tremendous influence of Christian churches in
the country, and also government trepidation concerning kastom’s rebel-
lious roots in Maasina Rule and subsequent revolutionary movements.
Government disregard for kastom has, not surprisingly, only increased its
salience as a basis for resistance ideologies. Now that government offi-
cials are attempting to promote kastom as a national symbol, they, like all
who attempt to tame liberation imagery for nationalistic purposes, risk
strengthening forces that remain essentially antigovernment in the eyes of
many citizens (see also Frye 1996; Lindstrom 1997).
There are conflicts over this issue within the government itself, particu-
larly regarding legal matters. The Solomons political field has been com-
plicated by what Frazer recently noted in this journal as “a de facto shift
in power and administrative authority from public servants to politi-
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of the western-based legal system, while politicians have been more re-
sponsive, in both rhetoric and practice, to constituent calls for the strength-
ening of kastom law (see Steeves 1996, 133). For instance, in one 1990
case, two Malaitan parliamentarians engineered the release from prison
of an already-sentenced Kwara‘ae murderer after the family of his Kwaio
victim (the son of Wa‘ifurina, quoted earlier) received death compen-
sation from the killer’s kin (see Kwa‘ioloa and Burt 1997, 144–155).
Since then, police officials have been at pains to see that this does
not recur, while many Malaitans, including elected officials, push for
similar resolutions of other murder and assault cases. Within Honiara
itself a Malaitan “Council of Chiefs,” supported by politicians, hears
disputes involving Malaitans to the exclusion of government courts,
despite police demands that they cease their activities (Solomon Star, 24
Nov 1993). These controversies are, of course, as much battles over the
distribution of power in the country as they are about specific crimes and
punishments.
The situation is further complicated because many public servants (a
very large number of whom are Malaitans) are themselves sympathetic
toward kastom political ideas and increasingly ambivalent about the gov-
ernment in which they serve. It is a serious error to always perceive pro-
kastom statements by state officials as no more than insincere manipula-
tions by westernized elites (compare Philibert 1986).
The political message that Malaitans delivered in Honiara’s streets was
not only one of dissatisfaction with the government, but also one of defi-
ance of government control over their island and their affairs. With the
steady rise of corruption, and growing public disgust with all aspects of
government mismanagement, many Malaitans sense the weakening of an
old adversary. The riots conveyed this powerfully in a dual manner. By
using force to compel the government and its soldiers to back down in
Honiara, they demonstrated that the government does not possess the legal
or coercive power to dictate Malaitan behavior, even on its own turf. Fur-
ther, they compelled the government to pay compensation, a key symbol
of Malaitan kastom law, political power, and autonomy. For the men
involved in the Honiara riots, as for the Kwaio pursuing the Bell compen-
sation, the idea of forcing the government itself to pay compensation to
Malaitans is a compelling one that is not likely to vanish soon.
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Notes
1 One tends to describe these Melanesians as treating the government “as if”
it were a rival kin group. But to the degree that government positions and power
are distributed through personal or wantok connections, government and kin-
based identities may indeed overlap, particularly within local-level politics. This
is especially glaring for groups like the mountain Kwaio with no one in govern-
ment positions (see Gewertz and Errington 1991, 190).
2 For discussion of kastom ideologies and politics in Kwaio and the Solomons
more generally see Akin (1993, 1996); Burt (1994); Keesing (1992); and White
(1993).
3 For more detailed analyses of these events see Akin (1993, 431–589), Fifi‘i
(1989, 151–166), and Keesing (1990; 1992, 156–172, 190–195). Fifi‘i presented
much valuable information and keen insights, but his account, also relied on
heavily by Keesing, should be read with caution: he and Folofo‘u were vehement
political enemies.
4 Be cautioned that, although Kwaio sometimes distinguish “affairs of ances-
tors” from “affairs of living people,” and do so clearly here, concepts of
“sacred” and “secular” as distinct realms fit uncomfortably with broader Kwaio
conceptions of the world.
5 For a detailed analysis of the native court system and the discontents it gen-
erated, and the consequent emergence of the kastom concept on Malaita, see
Akin (1993, 170–430).
6 Contra Fifi‘i (1989, 156–157), this was strongly supported by mountain
pagans and also by many coastal Christians.
7 Ma‘aanamae grew up in Basiana’s hamlet and was taught by him as a boy.
The prominence of legal issues in Kwaio conceptions of the government is appar-
ent when “law” (loa) becomes an alternative label for the state generally, as here
and in Ruita’s claim quoted earlier.
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Abstract
As Melanesian countries enter their third decade of independence, diverse local
communities are seeking to transform their status in relation to the state. Many
are attempting to frame their interactions with government in terms of indige-
nous cultural models that presume social equivalence. When thus applied, these
models themselves acquire new meanings. This paper explores this process in
relation to ideas about compensation among Malaitans in the Solomon Islands
who have since independence pressed several claims against the central govern-
ment. The focus is on a series of claims made by Kwaio people, beginning in the
1980s, regarding crimes of a 1927 punitive expedition that followed the assassi-
nation of a district officer and his party. Ethnographic, historical, and political
analyses are combined to explain why Kwaio find this compensation demand
such an appealing way to approach the government. The case also illuminates
violent compensation riots that rocked the capital, Honiara, in 1989 and 1996.
keywords: compensation, identity, kastom, Kwaio, Malaita, Solomon Islands,
urban violence
